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Summary 
Competition between the United States and China has been a central focus of global power 
politics for some time now. As confrontation over Taiwan became less likely in recent years, 
China’s maritime and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas arguably have 
become the most prominent issue that could trigger a military conflict between the two 
giants. The United States is a central actor in China’s maritime and territorial disputes. 
Although it does not have territorial claims in the waters, the United States as the dominant 
global naval power has a strong self-interest in preserving the freedom of navigation in the 
region. More important, the United States has alliance treaties with Japan and the 
Philippines, and both allies have maritime and territorial disputes with China. This issue 
might entangle the United States in the allies’ military conflict. Beyond the treaty 
obligations, the United States has been considered to be the defender of the regional status 
quo, which leaves maritime boundaries in China’s neighboring waters contested.  
This report analyzes the perceived applicability of the alliance commitments, provided 
by the United States to Japan and to the Philippines, to their maritime and territorial 
disputes with China. After an examination of the treaty texts themselves, it discusses how 
the allies and China have seen the links between the alliances and the disputes because the 
texts of the alliance agreements alone do not offer easy interpretation and there is no 
authoritative judge of the applicability. Indeed, the texts of the US-Japan and the US-
Philippines alliance agreements are actually quite similar, but subtle differences in the texts 
make their meanings significantly different. The interpretations of their applicability by the 
relevant actors have important consequences for the dispute dynamics. Moreover, a sound 
assessment of the alliance obligations is also important to analyze how developments in the 
waters will affect the credibility of US alliances in Asia and elsewhere.  
Analyzing treaty texts, public statements, declassified documents, and policies of the 
relevant actors, this report seeks to provide a comprehensive assessment of this important 
issue. It demonstrates that the provisions of the US-Japan alliance are widely considered to 
be applicable to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute whereas those of the US-Philippine alliance 
have only vague applicability to the South China Sea disputes. At the same time, this report 
discusses how details in the texts of the alliance agreements have important implications for 
the dispute dynamics. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that the disputants are conscious 
of the conditions for activation of the US alliances; in various ways, Japan and the 
Philippines seek to ensure US involvement against China, while China’s policy in the 
disputes appears to be designed to avoid US involvement. 
This report also shows that it is misleading to see the United States simply as a defender 
of its allies and deterrer of China. Media accounts and declassified information suggest that 
the United States has made efforts to restrain the allies. These efforts, in combination with 
the US neutrality on the issue of sovereignty in the disputes, have probably moderated the 
emboldening effects of US security commitment. Additional support from the United States 
to Japan and the Philippines is likely to (and should) be combined with further measures to 
limit possible escalation by the Asian allies. 
 II 
Given the pivotal position the United States holds in the disputes’ dynamics, China, 
Japan, and the Philippines should take the US (conditional) neutrality on the disputes 
seriously. Granted, the United States may be keeping a façade to maintain strategic 
flexibility, but its position is still useful for avoiding escalation of the disputes, as long as it is 
combined with deterrence against military aggression. Rather than complaining about the 
problems of the US position, it is more constructive for the disputants to compete in their 
positive contribution to the peaceful management of the disputes, with the United States 
and the international society as the audience. 
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1.  Introduction1  
In the last several years, tensions between the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) 
and its maritime neighbors have significantly increased. According to the Pew Research 
Center (2014: 8), “in all 11 Asian nations polled, roughly half or more say they are 
concerned that territorial disputes between China and its neighbors will lead to a military 
conflict. This includes a remarkably high 93% of Filipinos, [and] 85% of Japanese.”2 
Maritime and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas have persisted for 
decades, but China’s rise and its alleged “new assertiveness” (cf. Johnston 2013) have added 
gravity to the quarrels. Although it may sound absurd, “disputes about clumps of rock could 
become as significant as the assassination of an archduke,” which triggered the First World 
War (The Economist 2012). The rapid economic growth and rising military expenditure of 
China have enabled Beijing to increase its maritime presence in its neighboring waters. As 
Figure 1 shows, China’s military expenditure has grown dramatically in the last 20 years. It 
now dwarfs those of its neighbors, although it still lags behind that of the United States. As 
China aims to increase its power-projection capability and to limit that of the United States 
in Asia, China’s naval modernization effort presents one of the most important challenges 
against the US-led security order.3 This has led to tensions between the United States and 
China, most notably in the maritime sphere.  
Figure 1: Military expenditures in 1995 and 2015, in constant 2014 US$ (billions)4 
 
 
1  For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this report, the author is grateful to Evgeniya Bakalova, Peter 
Kreuzer, Carolin Liss, Carsten Rauch, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Annabel Schmitz, Bruno Schoch, Niklas 
Schörnig, and Jonas Wolff. 
2  There are no directly comparable past survey results, but the inclusion of the question itself reveals 
increased international attention to the disputes. 
3  On China’s naval modernization, see, for example, O’Rourke (2015b).  
4  “Figures are […] at constant 2014 prices and exchange rates, except for the last figure [2015], which is […] 
at 2015 prices and exchange rates” (SIPRI 2015).  
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Competition between the United States and China has been a central focus of global power 
politics for some time now (e.g., Christensen 1999; Ross 1999, 2006; Mearsheimer 2001, 
2010; Chan 2007, 2012; Friedberg 2011; White 2012; Glaser 2015). As confrontation over 
Taiwan became less likely in recent years5 – Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency 
(2008–2016) has significantly improved its relations with Beijing – China’s maritime and 
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas arguably have become the most 
prominent issue that could trigger a military conflict between the two giants.  
The United States is a central actor in China’s maritime and territorial disputes. 
Although it does not have territorial claims in the waters, the United States as the dominant 
global naval power has a strong self-interest in preserving the freedom of navigation in the 
region.6 Moreover, the United States has alliance treaties with Japan and the Philippines, 
which might entangle the United States in the allies’ military conflict. Beyond the treaty 
obligations, the United States has been considered to be the defender of the regional status 
quo, which leaves maritime boundaries in China’s neighboring waters contested.  
In order for anyone to develop sound policy on the disputes, it is essential to have a 
better understanding of the relevant US alliance obligations, their applicability, 
interpretations and resulting expectations. One of the key questions on this issue concerns 
the applicability of the US alliance obligations to the disputes. This report examines how the 
allies and China have seen the links between the alliances and the disputes because the texts 
of the alliance agreements alone do not offer easy interpretation and there is no 
authoritative judge of the applicability. Indeed, the texts of the alliance agreements between 
the United States and Japan and between the United States and the Philippines are actually 
quite similar, but subtle differences in the texts make their meanings significantly different. 
The interpretations of US alliance obligations affect the behavior of not only the United 
States but also that of the US allies and China. Although other factors also affect the 
strategic calculations of the disputants and the United States, the applicability has direct 
relevance to various effects of the US alliances (e.g., deterrence or provocation of China, 
restraining or emboldening of the US allies).  
In fact, the interpretations of the US alliance obligations have implications for other 
areas of the world as well. Justifiably or not, many think that the credibility of a US alliance 
is strongly connected with that of other US alliances.7 From this perspective, US behavior in 
the East and South China Seas will affect (and will be affected by) developments elsewhere. 
The credibility of US alliances, however, should be assessed with proper attention to the 
context. Alliance literature has shown that contents of alliance agreements – especially, 
conditions for intervention – matter in dispute dynamics (e.g., Leeds et al. 2000; Benson 
 
5  Tsai Ing-wen took the Taiwanese presidency in May 2016, and the direction of the Cross-Strait relations 
under her administration is yet to be seen. 
6  China objects to the United States’ military activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The US 
position is that a coastal state does not have the right to regulate foreign military activities beyond 12-
nautical-mile territorial waters (O’Rourke 2015a).  
7  For that matter, the credibility of the United States as a security supplier is critically seen even with respect 
to states without alliance ties with Washington (see, for example, Cooper/Fackler 2014). 
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2011; Kim 2011). In order to make a sound assessment of the credibility of the United States 
as a security supplier, we need to have a clear idea about the applicability of US alliance 
agreements to various disputes. 
This report, therefore, examines the applicability of the US military alliance agreements 
with Japan and the Philippines to the latter two states’ maritime and territorial disputes with 
China by analyzing treaty texts, public statements, declassified documents, and policies.8 
More specifically, this report explains the contents of the alliance agreements that are most 
relevant to the disputes and examines how the allies and China have interpreted the 
connections between the alliances and the disputes. The analysis goes back to the 1970s but, 
as will be explained later, the role of the US alliances has become more important from 
around mid-1990s.  
The following sections elucidate the history of the disputes, the relevant clauses of the 
alliance agreements, and the positions of the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and 
China. It will be demonstrated that whereas the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is within the scope 
of the US-Japan alliance, the applicability of the US-Philippines alliance in the South China 
Sea is vague at best. The conclusion summarizes the findings and discusses their policy 
implications. 
2.  Sino-Japanese disputes and the US-Japan Alliance 
2.1  Sino-Japanese maritime and territorial disputes  
China and Japan have disputes over maritime boundary and territory in the East China 
Sea.9 The maritime boundary issue arises from the two countries’ different interpretations 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both have 
ratified. While Japan argues that the maritime boundary should be drawn according to a 
median line between the two countries’ undisputed territories, China claims the whole 
continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough as “the natural prolongation” of China’s land 
territory (Xinhuanet 2012; Dolven et al. 2014). The territorial dispute is over Japanese-
controlled islands called the Senkaku by Japan and the Diaoyu by China (and called the 
Diaoyutai by Taiwan, which also claims the islands).10 As the disagreement over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been more hostile and entails higher risks of military conflict 
than the dispute over maritime boundaries, this report focuses on the territorial dispute. 
 
8  Case selection for this report is based on the substantive importance of the cases. Future research (for 
example, regarding the effects of US alliance obligations on dispute dynamics) should include cases with 
wider variation in US commitment. 
9   A map of the disputed areas is displayed in Figure 2 (page 6). 
10  The Chinese Nationalist Party lost the civil war to the Communist Party and fled to Taiwan, and the 
Republic of China government on Taiwan maintains China’s historical territorial claims. 
4 Tongfi Kim
 
 
The Chinese government argues that the islands have historically belonged to China, 
and Japan annexed the islands as a victor of the Sino-Japanese War, which ended with the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895.11 Among other things, Japan annexed Taiwan through 
the treaty. China claims that the Diaoyu Islands were under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, 
which in turn belonged to the Qing Dynasty (State Council Information Office 2012). 
Although Japan argues that the annexation of the islands was separate from the war, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, from the Chinese perspective, should have been returned to 
China, as Japan abandoned its imperial conquests like Taiwan after the Second World War. 
Due to the islands’ perceived links to China’s humiliation at the hands of Japanese 
imperialism, the territorial issue has emotional significance in Chinese discourse. China 
makes a geography-based claim to the islands as well – namely, that the islands are on 
China’s continental shelf – but the history-based claim has stronger resonance for the 
Chinese people. 
In contrast, the Japanese government, which currently controls the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, does not acknowledge that there is a territorial dispute over the islands. It argues 
that the islands were uninhabited when Japan incorporated them in January 1895. From 
the Japanese perspective, the Senkaku Islands are not part of the imperial territory Japan 
abandoned after the Second World War. Under the terms of the 1951 Treaty of Peace 
with Japan,12 the United States administered the islands until 1972, when it returned to 
Japan the administrative control of the islands, along with that of Okinawa and other 
islands.13 The Japanese government contends that China and Taiwan began claiming the 
islands only in 1971, after a survey by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East in 1968 discovered potential undersea oil reserves in the East China Sea 
(MFA Japan 2013, 2014). 
Although Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have seen numerous 
ups and downs since the 1970s, the dispute has gained larger symbolic significance over 
time, and informal compromise has become more difficult (see, for example, Manicolm 
2014). In the past, there was an unofficial agreement between Chinese and Japanese 
leaders to “shelve” the dispute and maintain the status quo, although the Japanese 
government denies the existence of such an agreement.14 In the last several years, tension 
has risen high in the waters near the islands. In September 2010, the Japanese government 
arrested and threatened to prosecute a Chinese trawler captain after collisions between his 
 
11  The Japanese government emphasizes that the Treaty of Shimonoseki does not specifically mention the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
12  Neither the People’s Republic of China nor the Republic of China (Taiwan) was invited to the conference 
for the 1951 treaty. 
13  Note that the United States simply returned the “administrative rights” without specifying to whom the 
islands belong. 
14  Since the Japanese government nationalized three of the disputed islands on 11 September 2012, the 
Chinese government has criticized it as a violation of the agreement. Such an agreement is confirmed in a 
recently declassified British government document (Tiezzi 2015; Asahi Shimbun 2015).  
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ship and two Japanese coast guard vessels.15 This led to suspected retaliatory behavior by 
China, including cancellation of official visits, detention of four Japanese nationals for 
videotaping in a restricted military zone, and an alleged “embargo” on rare-earth exports to 
Japan (Hagström 2012; Smith 2013).16 In September 2012, tensions rose again because the 
Japanese government purchased three of the disputed islands from a private individual. The 
Japanese government explained that the move was to prevent the purchase of the islands by 
a Japanese nationalist group. This excuse, however, did not mollify either the Chinese 
government or Chinese public opinion, and massive anti-Japanese protests spread across 
China.  
On its part, China has also been engaging in actions that escalate tensions. As Taylor M. 
Fravel (2012) puts it, China’s strategy is now to “redefine the status quo”: “China has used 
the presence of its civilian maritime law enforcement agencies to create new facts on the 
water to strengthen China’s sovereignty claims.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesperson asserted that patrols near the disputed islands are “routine” and “the Japanese 
side should face squarely the reality that a fundamental change has already occurred in the 
Diaoyu Islands” (quoted in Fravel 2012).17 In November 2013, China announced its “East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (ECS ADIZ), which includes air space over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Xinhuanet 2013). Although other states in the region had already 
established their own ADIZ, many worried about how the Chinese ADIZ would be 
implemented.18 So far, Chinese “actions in the ECS ADIZ have been largely in line with 
international norms regarding ADIZs” (Rinehart/Elias 2015: 10). The Japanese, however, 
have complained about provocative incidents related to the Chinese ADIZ. For example, 
the Japanese government has accused Chinese fighter jets of flying dangerously close to 
Japanese reconnaissance planes in May and June 2014 (Rinehart/Elias 2015: 12–13). 
  
 
15  Sourabh Gupta (2010) points out that Japan had not previously “threatened indictment and prosecution 
of such law-breakers in a domestic court of law” with respect to the dispute and thus “was setting a 
consequential precedent in the exercise of jurisdiction over contentious territory […] taking a significant 
diplomatic risk.” On September 24, 17 days after the arrest, the Japanese government made a political 
decision to release the trawler captain. 
16  The link between the incident and some of these policies is not clearly established. For critical analyses on 
the rare earth trade dispute, see, for instance, Hagström (2012: 282–283) and Johnston (2013: 23–26). 
17  The number of Chinese vessels entering the contested waters has increased dramatically after Japan’s 
nationalization of the three islands (MFA Japan 2016) 
18   For a comparison of rules of ADIZ by different states, see, for example, Rinehart/Elias (2015: 4). 
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Figure 2: Map of the disputed areas in the East and South China Seas 
 
2.2  Treaty text of the US-Japan alliance and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute  
The United States and Japan, former enemies of the Second World War, have been military 
allies since 1951, when the two countries signed the first security treaty as well as the Peace 
Treaty of San Francisco. The two states subsequently renewed the alliance in 1960, by 
signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and 
Japan. The following sentence in Article 5 of the 1960 treaty is the most relevant with regard 
to the Sino-Japanese disputes.  
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan [emphasis added] would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
provisions and processes.”19  
 
19  www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. The phrase, “in accordance with its constitutional 
provisions and processes,” was “included to assuage congressional concerns that the agreements could be 
interpreted as sanctioning the President to engage in military hostilities in defense of treaty parties without 
further congressional authorization (i.e., a declaration of war or joint resolution authorizing the use of 
military force)” (Garcia/Mason 2012: 10). Such a constitutional limitation is mentioned in most alliance 
agreements the United States has formed after the Second World War. 
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There is always room for different interpretations of a treaty text, but a straightforward 
interpretation of the clause would mean that the United States is obligated to defend Japan 
against China’s armed attack on the currently Japanese-controlled Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands.20 Although the original motivations behind the treaty text were not related to the 
Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea,21 the treaty imposes on the United States a 
defense obligation that is now clearly related to the disputes.22 Of course, what matters in 
reality is not how the treaty text sounds but how the relevant actors interpret the 
applicability. Let us now turn to the positions of the United States, Japan and China on 
the alliance and the dispute.  
2.3  US position on the US-Japan alliance and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute  
It is important to distinguish the United States’ positions on the territorial dispute between 
China and Japan on one hand, and on the applicability of the US-Japan alliance to the 
dispute on the other hand. On the issue of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the 
US government has taken a neutral position. At the same time, however, the United States 
has also confirmed that the US-Japan security treaty will apply to a conflict over the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands, because the islands are territories under the administration of Japan. 
The neutrality of the United States on the issue of sovereignty was expressed as early as 
10 September 1970, by Robert J. McCloskey, the spokesperson for the US Department of 
State (Tomabechi 2015: 168, 180). In his letter of 20 October 1971 for the Senate hearings 
on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser Robert Starr made the 
following remark (quoted in Manyin 2013: 5):23  
“The Governments of the Republic of China [Taiwan] and Japan are in disagreement as to 
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. You should know as well that the People’s Republic of 
China has also claimed sovereignty over the islands. The United States believes that a return 
of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, 
can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal 
rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the 
United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The 
United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting 
claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.”  
This neutral position has been confirmed by subsequent US administrations to the present 
day. 
 
20  To some readers, the clause might sound ambiguous and weak, but such language is common in alliance 
agreements, and few alliance agreements declare automatic involvement.  
21  Note that the islands were administered by the United States at the time.  
22  On the strategic considerations behind the 1960 treaty, see, for example, Kim (2011: 366–368) and Kim 
(2016, Chapter 6).  
23  Although this report focuses on the Sino–Japanese disputes, the US position was also influenced by its 
considerations for Taiwan, a formal US ally at the time of the return of the islands to Japan. 
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Despite this neutrality, the United States has also maintained that the 1960 US-Japan 
security treaty is applicable to the defense of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Initially, this 
applicability could be inferred from the terms of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty and the 
1960 treaty. In his testimony to the Senate hearings on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 
October 1971, Secretary of State William Rogers noted that the 1960 treaty was applicable 
to the territory being returned to Japan, which includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (US 
Senate 1971: 22). A Congressional Research Service report also points out that the Senate 
did not include a reservation concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in its advice and 
consent to the ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, despite the advice of several 
committee witnesses to do so (Manyin 2013: 6).  
The US government clarified the applicability of its defense commitment specifically 
with respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 1996.24 Japan ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in June 1996 and declared its Exclusive Economic 
Zone, including around the disputed islands. This and a Japanese right-wing group’s 
construction of a light house on one of the islands led to counteractions by China and 
heightened tensions (GlobalSecurity.org 2013). In September 1996, the New York Times 
published an article in which US Ambassador to Japan Walter F. Mondale was quoted to 
have said that “American forces would not be compelled by the [US-Japan security] treaty 
to intervene in a dispute over” the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Kristof 1996a). As this 
statement raised concerns in Japan, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia 
and the Pacific Kurt Campbell in November and Secretary of Defense William Perry in 
December refuted it by confirming the applicability of the US-Japan security treaty to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (GlobalSecurity.org 2012; Fravel 2010: 148).25 
Subsequently, the applicability of the security treaty to the islands has been repeatedly 
confirmed by various officials of the US government. In February 2004, then Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage assured the Japanese that the US-Japan security treaty 
“would require any attack on Japan, or the administrative territories under Japanese 
control, to be seen as an attack on the United States” (Armitage 2004). In March 2004, after 
Chinese activists landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman 
for the US Department of State, confirmed that “Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty 
applies to the Senkaku Islands” (Ereli 2004). In February 2009, Larry Walker, a spokes-
person for the American Institute in Taiwan (which serves the role of the US embassy in 
Taipei), stated that the US-Japan treaty applies to the islands (Kyodo 2009). 
 
24  Larry A. Niksch, an analyst of the Congressional Research Service (then called Legislative Reference 
Service) had earlier written a paper titled “Competing Claims to the Senkaku Islands,” dated May 28, 
1974, in which he concludes that the security treaty applies to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. See Eldridge 
(2013: 19) and Kristof (1996b).  
25  Campbell recalls that his statement required some work with legal experts and implies that there was 
resistance within the US government to his clarification (Oshima 2015). 
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As tensions escalated between China and Japan in recent years, the US government 
made further reassurance.26 Following Japan’s arrest of the Chinese trawler captain in 
September 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in October 2010 that the 
United States has “made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty 
obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan” (Clinton 2010). In September 2012, 
shortly after the Japanese government’s purchase of the three islands, Kurt Campbell, 
then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, reiterated the US 
position that “the Senkaku Islands fall clearly under article 5 of the Security Treaty” (US 
Senate 2012). More recently, China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea 
seems to have hardened the US stance against China in the East China Sea as well. In 
January 2016, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the Pacific Command, stated that the 
United States “will clearly defend them [the Senkaku Islands] if they are attacked by 
China,” naming China as a potential aggressor (Kyodo 2016a).  
In addition to confirming the US treaty obligation based on Japan’s administration of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the US government has more recently begun reassuring 
Japan by opposing actions against Japan’s administration of the islands. This is likely to be 
a response to Japan’s concern about China’s increasing maritime presence near the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, through which Beijing seeks to erode Japan’s administrative 
control. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the United States 
Congress declared that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United 
States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands” (US 
Congress 2013). In January 2013, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also stated that 
the United States opposes “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese 
administration” (Clinton 2013). In April 2014, President Barack Obama reemphasized 
this point by saying that the Senkaku Islands have been historically administered by 
Japan, and the US government does “not believe that they should be subject to change 
unilaterally. And what is a consistent part of the alliance is that the treaty covers all 
territories administered by Japan” (White House 2014a). 
Finally, despite the repeated public reassurance from the US government, it is 
important to acknowledge that the United States has also sought to restrain Japan to 
avoid the risk of escalation in Sino-Japanese disputes. From publicly available 
information, the Obama administration seems to have been more cautious about 
provoking China in its early years, especially before tension rose in September 2010.27 In 
August 2010, for example, Kyodo News (2010) reported that the Obama administration 
 
26  It is important to note that these reassuring statements are usually combined with the US neutrality on the 
sovereignty of the islands, and the US government tries to restrain Japan as well. 
27  Unfortunately, there is little information about private communication between the allies. It is likely, 
however, that the Obama administration has been communicating less enthusiastic support to Japan in 
private. Public confirmation of US commitment serves both deterrence of China and reassurance of Japan 
whereas privately warning Japan about US reluctance to get involved can restrain Japan in the disputes. 
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had decided not to state explicitly that the US-Japan security treaty applies to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in order to avoid irritating China.28  
Even after the Obama administration increased its public support to Japan in response 
to the rising tension in the East and South China Seas and perceived assertiveness of 
China, it still continued a cautious approach. For instance, a declassified email forwarded 
to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reveals that the US government urged Japan to 
“consult and advise Beijing on their plans” before Japan nationalized three of the Senkaku 
Islands in September 2012 (Kyodo 2016b). Before the US Congress included the wording 
“unilateral action of a third party” (meaning China) in the draft for the 2013 National 
Defense Authorization Act, the US government took a position to “oppose any unilateral 
action to change the status quo,” not distinguishing China and Japan (Oshima 2014). 
Although President Obama reconfirmed the applicability of the alliance to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes in his remark in April 2014 discussed earlier, it should also be 
noted that the following passage was accompanying the commitment: 
“In our discussions, I emphasized with Prime Minister Abe the importance of resolving this 
issue peacefully – not escalating the situation, keeping the rhetoric low, not taking 
provocative actions, and trying to determine how both Japan and China can work 
cooperatively together. And I want to make that larger point. We have strong relations with 
China. They are a critical country not just to the region, but to the world.” (White House 
2014a) 
In the questions and answers following the remark, President Obama further stated that 
he has “said directly to the Prime Minister [Abe] that it would be a profound mistake to 
continue to see escalation around this issue rather than dialogue and confidence-building 
measures between Japan and China” (White House 2014a).29 Let us now turn to the 
position of Japan. 
  
 
28  The US Department of State denied this, but the questions and answers on this issue at the daily press 
briefing are revealing. Only after lengthy exchanges in which he avoided explicit statement, Assistant 
Secretary Philip J. Crowley (2010) stated that “if you ask today would the treaty apply to the Senkaku Islands, 
the answer is yes.”  
29  The US government has encouraged Japanese leaders to avoid provoking China in other issues as well. 
For instance, in October 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel 
visited the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery to indicate that the cemetery is a better alternative to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. Japanese politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have been controversial, because it 
honors war criminals of the Second World War. In December 2013, after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the US embassy in Tokyo stated on its website that “[t]he United States is 
disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s 
neighbors” (Nishiyama 2013).  
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2.4  Japanese position on the US-Japan alliance and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute 
Although the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has been an important issue for Japan since 
the early 1970s, the applicability of the US-Japan alliance to the islands was not an 
important question until relatively recently. After the Sino-American rapprochement in 
the early 1970s, China and the US-Japan alliance entered a cooperative relationship 
against the threat of the Soviet Union. The Chinese government was content to shelve the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute because it had strong strategic interests in maintaining good 
relationships with Japan and the West. Moreover, even in the post-Cold War era, when the 
alignments of strategic interests shifted, China’s modest naval capability did not pose a 
serious threat to Japan. The applicability of the US-Japan security treaty became salient only 
after 1996, when US Ambassador to Japan Mondale’s interview stirred controversy (see the 
previous section). Japanese concerns grew later as China’s military capability improved 
rapidly and as China began showing “new assertiveness” (cf. Johnston 2013) around 2010. 
Many Japanese believe in the deterrence effect of the US-Japan alliance, but they are also 
skeptical about the continuation of the current commitment level in the future. While 
China’s military expenditure continues to grow rapidly, the United States has been facing 
serious financial constraints on its military spending after the global financial crisis of 2007–
2009. China’s importance in the global economy also seems to compel the United States to 
take a conciliatory attitude toward Beijing. China replaced Japan as the second largest 
economy in the world in 2010. Like Former Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, many 
Japanese have doubts about US support for Japan in the future when China’s gross domestic 
product is even larger (Maehara 2012: 69). 
In a crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan is supposed to take the first defense 
responsibility to deal with China, and the Japanese are increasingly anxious about this 
military responsibility. During the US Senate hearings in 1971 on the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard defended the treaty partially by 
pointing out that the primary responsibility of defense for the returned territory would 
transfer to Japan (US Senate 1971: 44). In 2005, the US-Japan Security Consultative 
Committee noted that “Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas 
surrounding Japan, including […] invasion of remote islands” (US-Japan SCC 2005). By the 
late 2000s, however, China’s military rise has caused strong anxiety among the Japanese. 
Consequently, the government under the Democratic Party of Japan in 2010 adopted a 
defense policy that placed more emphasis on the defense of its southwest island chain. 
According to Akihisa Nagashima, who as Vice Minister of Defense participated in the 
planning, “[t]he growing influence of China and the relative decline of the US was a factor,” 
and the Japanese government wanted to “help ensure the sustainability of the US forward 
deployment” (Kelly/Kubo 2015). The new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation 
(which was originally approved in 1978 and revised in 1997) released in April 2015 states 
that “[t]he Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to 
prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-
Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island” (MoD Japan 2015). 
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In order to understand the current concerns of Japanese policy makers, we need to recall 
that the US defense commitment applies to “an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan.” As some Japanese experts have pointed out, 
China may try to take control of the islands while taking various measures to avoid the 
involvement of the United States. For example, Masashi Nishihara argues that China can 
send militia disguised as fishermen so that the invasion does not constitute an “armed” 
attack (Minnick 2013). Whether China’s challenge comes as a “surprise grab” or “creeping 
invasion” (that is, gradually eroding Japanese administration), US defense commitment 
may become useless if Japan loses the administrative control of the islands (Rapp-Hooper 
2015: 135). Thus, the qualification in the treaty text explains why the Japanese are uneasy 
about taking the first responsibility to defend the Senkaku/Diaoyu. Yoichiro Sato (2012) 
succinctly summarizes the concern: 
“Despite the US rhetoric that the alliance applies to ‘all areas under the Japanese 
administration,’ Japan sees a loophole in the US position. Because Japan has been asked by 
the United States to shoulder ‘primary responsibility’ for its territorial defense, a growing 
number of Japanese believe that the US commitment to retaking the Senkakus if Japan loses 
administrative control to an invasion by China would be unavailable.” 
This anxiety over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute has exacerbated Japan’s post-Cold War 
concern about US security commitment. In order to strengthen US commitment, the 
Japanese government in the post-Cold War era has made significant efforts to please the US 
government (Kim 2016, chapter 4), but China’s threat accelerated Japan’s diplomatic and 
defense efforts. Most significantly, this took the form of expanding Japan’s own security 
commitment to the alliance. The Abe cabinet in July 2014 reinterpreted Japan’s pacifist 
constitution in order to exercise the right of collective self-defense.30 Related new security 
laws passed the Japanese National Diet in September 2015. As an anonymous senior US 
defense official commented, the 2015 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation also 
“loosens the restriction on what Japan can do” militarily, and the United States and Japan 
will “be able to do a lot of things globally” that in the past they could do only in the defense 
of Japan (McLeary 2015). US-Japan security cooperation has traditionally been upgraded by 
US initiatives, but the revision of the guidelines this time was requested by the Japanese 
government under the Democratic Party of Japan in November 2012 (Nagashima 2015). 
The major motivation behind this Japanese request was to counter the rising threat of China 
by strengthening the US-Japan alliance. 
Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second term (since 2012) has been pursuing 
active foreign policy to counter China’s threat. Although the moderate increase in Japan’s 
defense spending under Abe does help improve Japan’s military capability, maintaining US 
military commitment to the defense of Japan has been a more important task for Japan. 
Thus, for instance, the Japanese government recently conceded to the US demand for 
increased economic contribution for US forces stationed in Japan for the fiscal years 2016 to 
2020 (Asahi Shimbun 2016). 
 
30  The US government has advocated Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense for many years.  
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Finally, it is conceivable that Japan requests the activation of the US-Japan alliance 
against China in maritime disputes unrelated to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For instance, a 
Congressional Research Service Report makes the following point: 
“It is unclear to what extent and in which situations the US-Japan Mutual Security treaty, 
which refers to an armed attack on the territories under the administration of Japan, would 
apply in the event of a Sino-Japanese military conflict over the two countries’ maritime 
boundary dispute. Regardless of the treaty’s technicalities and its interpretation, however, it is 
likely that Japanese policymakers and citizens would expect that the treaty would apply to any 
Sino-Japanese military conflict, including those involving the competing maritime claims.” 
(Manyin 2013: 7) 
In my view, however, as long as the military conflict is limited in scale, technicalities of the 
treaty should help the United States to avoid involvement without too much damage to its 
credibility. 
2.5  Chinese position on the US-Japan alliance and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute 
Many Chinese analysts believe that the US-Japan alliance is the largest obstacle to taking the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by force (International Crisis Group 2013: 23). The US 
government has clearly and repeatedly indicated that the US-Japan security treaty applies to 
the dispute. The Chinese government, therefore, should be estimating that US military 
intervention is highly likely if China tries to take the control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
with “an armed attack” as long as the islands are “under the administration of Japan”. 
China’s position on the US-Japan alliance has significantly shifted over time. In the early 
decades of the Cold War, China took a hostile stance against the US-Japan alliance but, as 
already mentioned, China since the early 1970s had somewhat cooperative relationships 
with the US-Japan alliance because of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. After the Sino-American 
rapprochement in 1971 and diplomatic normalization of China and Japan in 1972, China 
began accepting the US-Japan alliance. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, China even 
welcomed strengthening of the alliance. However, as the threat of the Soviet Union faded, 
and as China came out of international isolation in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, 
China lost incentives to support the alliance. Consequently, Beijing returned to more critical 
stance towards the alliance in the mid-1990s (see, for example, Sugiura 2011).  
Understandably, China opposes the involvement of the United States in the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu dispute. In fact, the Chinese government has never accepted the return of the 
administration of the disputed islands from the United States to Japan. It has “expressed 
strong opposition to the backroom deal between Japan and the United States for Diaoyu 
Dao, which lacked any basis for legality” (China Internet Information Center 2014). In 
addition to the necessity of asserting sovereignty in territorial disputes to maintain its 
claims, China has geopolitical rivalry with both the United States and Japan. No country 
readily gives up its territorial claims, but China’s current relations with the United States 
and Japan make it even more important for Chinese leaders to be unyielding. Although 
China has interests in maintaining good relationships with these two states as well, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute presents a salient battleground for Chinese nationalism. The US 
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neutrality on the issue of sovereignty over the islands is important but not trusted by many 
Chinese. From the perspective of popular Chinese nationalism, Japan is not only 
experiencing resurging militarism but also “acting as ‘a pawn of the US’ to encircle China” 
(Chu 2012). 
As Japanese policy makers fear, China appears to be attempting to erode Japan’s 
administration of the disputed islands. It is possible that American and Japanese experts are 
reading too much into Chinese policy. Even if China simply wants to maintain the status 
quo, China needs to continue its protest against Japan’s position, including its 
administrative control. This is especially the case when Japan seems to attempt reinforcing 
its control of the islands (for example, by arresting the Chinese trawler captain in 2010 and 
by nationalizing the three islands in 2012). Current Chinese policy, however, is also 
consistent with a China that is seeking to change the status quo in its favor while avoiding a 
direct confrontation with the United States. China is challenging Japan’s administration of 
the islands with continuous, non-militarized incursions to the disputed waters. Beijing has 
avoided US counter-moves through tactics focused on “gray zone,” which are aggressive but 
“remain below the level that usually triggers conventional military retaliation” (Roy 2015). 
Finally, China seeks to undermine the US-Japan alliance (and other US alliances) by 
raising fear of abandonment (that is, the alliance will not help the allies of the United States) 
and by emphasizing the risk of emboldenment and entanglement. Joseph Bosco, who served 
as China country director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States 
(2005–2006), makes the following point. 
“Beijing […] sows Asian doubts about US will and staying power while conveying a sense of 
inevitable Chinese regional dominance. It accuses Washington of emboldening reckless 
behavior from its security partners and then exploits any partner’s misstep as provocative 
conduct that will draw the US into conflict. Beijing’s message: collective security really means 
collective endangerment.” (Bosco 2013) 
For better or worse, interviews of Chinese analysts conducted by the International Crisis 
Group suggest that the Chinese side actually believes in these (sometimes contradicting) 
risks of abandonment, entanglement, and emboldenment, and even moderates believe that 
the growing US presence in the region has emboldened Japan.31  
In sum, the US-Japan alliance agreement is widely considered to be applicable to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, and this perceived applicability has influenced the policy of the 
United States, Japan, and China. 
 
31  China promotes Japan’s fear of abandonment as well. For instance, “[a]fter Abe’s visit to Washington [in 
February 2013] […] Chinese state media and commentators asserted that Obama had given Abe a ‘cold 
shoulder’, as he did not specifically mention the island issue” (International Crisis Group 2013: 23–24). 
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3.  Sino-Philippine disputes and the US-Philippines Alliance  
3.1  Sino-Philippine maritime and territorial disputes 
China and the Philippines have maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
(which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea). China’s vague, history-based claim of 
the U-shaped line (the so-called “nine-dash line”) includes much of the South China Sea. The 
People’s Republic of China inherited the broad claim made by the Republic of China since 
the 1930s.32 Chinese claims conflict with those of the Philippines in features such as part of 
the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.33 A legal advisor to the US Center for Naval 
Analyses points out that some of the Philippine claims (e.g., “ubiquitous” claims over the 
Kalayaan island group, which is part of the Spratly Islands) – like China’s U-shaped line – 
lack legal weight, and the Philippine claims were made later than those of China, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam. He argues, however, that other Philippine claims on features such as 
Scarborough Shoal, Reed Bank, and Mischief Reef are better supported (Rosen 2014).  
The Philippine government began sending troops to the Kalayaan island group in 1968, 
but the issue did not attract much attention until 1971 when the Philippine government 
officially announced its occupation of some features in the area (Baviera/ Batongbacal 2013: 
21). Because China is a late comer in terms of occupying land features in the South China 
Sea, the bilateral tension rose decades later. In the fall of 1994, China occupied Mischief 
Reef, a Philippine-claimed submerged feature in the Spratly Islands and part of the 
Philippine continental shelf (Fravel 2008: 296; Rosen 2014).34 Chinese-built structures on 
Mischief Reef were discovered by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in  
January 1995 and reported by Philippine fishermen in February 1995. This drew attention 
to China’s advances in the South China Sea although this reef was occupied without armed 
conflict (Fravel 2008: 296).35  
Since China’s occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, China and the Philippines have had 
intermittent episodes of minor but hostile exchanges in the South China Sea. To name some 
of the incidents, in 1996, three Chinese vessels engaged in a gun battle with a Philippine 
navy gunboat near Campones Island; in 1997, the Philippine navy ordered a Chinese 
speedboat and two fishing boats to leave Scarborough Shoal, and China sent three warships 
to survey Philippine-occupied Panata and Kota Islands; in 1998, the Philippine navy 
arrested Chinese fishermen off Scarborough Shoal; and in 1999, a Philippine gunboat 
 
32  The well-known dashed-line map of 1947 was based on an earlier one titled “Map of Chinese Islands in 
the South China Sea” published in 1935 by the Republic of China’s Land and Water Maps Inspection 
Committee (US Department of State 2014). 
33  They have disputes over features other than islands as well. See, for example, O’Rourke (2015a). 
34  Taiwan and Vietnam also claim Mischief Reef. 
35  China had violent clashes with South Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in 1974 and with unified Vietnam 
over Johnson South Reef in 1988. The Johnson South Reef is in the Spratly Islands and claimed by the 
Philippines as well, but the Philippine response to the 1988 incident was muted, perhaps due to the 
political climate after the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos (Kreuzer 2015: 12–13). 
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attacked three Chinese fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal, and one of the fishing boats 
was rammed and sunk (Klare 2001: 124; GlobalSecurity.org 2014). In 2000, Philippine 
soldiers shot at Chinese fishermen off Palawan Island (which is not a disputed territory), 
killing one and detaining seven; between January and March 2001, the Philippine navy 
boarded 14 Chinese-flagged ships and ejected the vessels from contested portions of the 
Spratly Islands (Center for a New American Security 2016; CNN 2001). The Philippines has 
taken a confrontational stance toward China despite their large capability gap, although the 
Philippine coast guard’s weakness partially explains the Philippine navy’s active role in these 
incidents. During the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010), the tension 
subsided due to her soft stance towards China. 
A major incident in the Sino-Philippine disputes came in 2012, when the two states 
engaged in a standoff over Scarborough Shoal and China eventually captured the control of 
the shoal. The crisis began in April when the Philippine navy tried to arrest Chinese 
fishermen operating near the shoal. The Chinese government reacted by sending its own 
maritime vessels to prevent the arrest, with People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels 
floating over the horizon as a deterrent against the Philippines (Ratner 2013). At the end of 
May, the United States brokered an informal agreement for a withdrawal of both Chinese 
and Philippine vessels, but China reneged on the deal in early June and returned to the 
shoal after the Philippine ships had departed (China denies that there was such an 
agreement). The Philippines sought to include a reference to this incident in a joint 
statement following the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in July 2012, but the host country 
Cambodia’s pro-China stance led to ASEAN’s first-ever failure in its 45-year history to issue 
a joint statement after its annual meeting (Fravel 2014: 6). 
Frustrated by lack of effective counter-measures, the Philippines in January 2013 filed a 
case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, “with respect to the 
dispute with China over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the West Philippine 
Sea” (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2016). China refused to participate, but the ruling of 
the tribunal is legally binding even without China’s participation, because both the 
Philippines (in 1984) and China (in 2006) have ratified the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Page 2015). In July 2016, the international tribunal in the 
Hague decided against Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea; “the decision was so heavily 
in favor of the Philippines that there were fears about how the Chinese leadership would 
react” (Perlez 2016). As it had previously declared, the Chinese government rejected the 
ruling. 
Since September 2013, China has been engaging in massive land reclamation in areas 
that are claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan. At least three of these 
features are within 200 nautical miles from the Philippine Island of Palawan and thus are 
within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that the Philippines claims (Dolven et al. 2015). 
As the Chinese government points out, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan, 
have also previously reclaimed land in the areas, but the scale of the Chinese activity is far 
larger than those of the other claimants combined. Because China’s new artificial islands 
have important military ramifications, the land reclamation has alarmed many countries, 
including the United States. 
US Alliance Obligations in the Disputes in the East and South China Seas 17
 
 
3.2  Treaty text of the US-Philippines alliance and the South China Sea 
disputes 
The Philippines, a former colony of the United States (1898–1946), has been a formal 
military ally of the United States since 1951. The following passages of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines are the most relevant 
with regard to the Sino-Philippine disputes in the South China Sea. 
Article IV 
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would 
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes […]”. 
Article V 
“For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include 
an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island 
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft 
in the Pacific.” 
It is important to note that the treaty was signed in August 1951, well before the Philippines 
acquired the features in the South China Sea and that the United States takes a neutral 
position on the issue of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. Again, there is room 
for different interpretations of the text, but it is not clear whether the US defense 
commitment applies to Philippine-controlled territories in the South China Sea, because the 
Philippines did not control the territories at the time of signing the treaty and the United 
States has not acknowledged the Philippine jurisdiction over the disputed territories. This is 
significantly different from the Japanese case, because the US government has clearly 
acknowledged the administrative control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by Japan. On the 
other hand, the text also implies that the United States has an obligation to defend 
Philippine “armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” (Article V) from an armed 
attack. The text itself, therefore, could still mean that the alliance can be activated in certain 
situations in a Sino-Philippine military conflict. Let us now turn to the positions of the 
United States, the Philippines and China on the alliance and the disputes. 
3.3   US position on the US-Philippines alliance and the South China Sea  
disputes 
The US position on the South China Sea disputes was first publicly revealed in a context 
outside the Sino-Philippine disputes. In the wake of a clash between China and South 
Vietnam in January 1974, the US Department of State declared that the South China Sea 
disputes were “for the claimants to settle among themselves” (Morrow 1974, quoted in Ang 
1999: 13).36 In private, the US government has also communicated to the Philippine side 
 
36  Incidentally, South Vietnam was not a formal military ally of the United States, despite the two countries’ 
strong security ties. 
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that it was reluctant to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty over the South China Sea 
disputes.37 Furthermore, on June 9, 1975, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a 
telegram to Admiral Noel Gayler, commander in chief, Pacific Command, and to the 
Manila Embassy, stated that Washington’s “legal interpretation is that MDT [Mutual 
Defense Treaty] commitments do not repeat not apply [sic] in event of attack on Spratlys or 
on GOP [Government of the Philippines] forces stationed there” (Fuller 2014).  
The US government, however, did not publicly deny the applicability of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty because some ambiguity seemed useful. The summary of a meeting on 
January 31, 1974 notes that Kissinger decided “[t]hat we do not want to do anything re the 
Spratly Islands that would encourage the PRC to believe it has a free hand to take military 
action or lead our allies to believe we are needlessly alarmed at the prospect of such action” 
(Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976). Since then, the US government has 
maintained neutrality on the sovereignty disputes and avoided clarifying its security 
commitment with respect to the disputes.  
Regarding the Sino-Philippine disputes in the South China Sea, many experts point out 
that the United States took the first public and official position in May 1995, following 
China’s occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994 to 1995 (e.g., Fravel 2014: 4; McDevitt 2014: 6). 
The statement released during a daily press briefing of the US Department of State does not 
mention any security commitment of the United States to the Philippines and instead 
emphasizes the US neutrality over the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea (Shelly 
1995). 
Although the United States still maintains the neutrality over the sovereignty issue and is 
careful to avoid emboldening the Philippines and provoking China, the US attitude toward 
China has become more critical in the last several years.38 For example, at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in July 2010, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton implicitly criticized 
China by making the following remark and angered then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi: 
“The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving 
the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any 
claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes 
over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial 
claims [...] and rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of 
the sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in 
 
37  In a meeting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Arthur Hummel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said that “the atmospherics surrounding our repeated statements about 
these islands certainly conveyed already to the Filipinos that we don’t intend to or that we don’t want to” 
invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty (Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976). 
38  One of the important features of the US rebalancing strategy is increased attention to Southeast Asia. This 
presented an excellent opportunity for the Philippines to seek stronger US support for its position on the 
disputes in the South China Sea.  
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the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.” (US 
Department of State 2010)39 
Clinton’s statement was framed as neutrality and adherence to international law, but it 
clearly collided with China’s position on the disputes (Chang 2010; Pomfret 2010). With 
China being the strongest state among the disputants, opposition against coercion helps 
opponents of China. Moreover, the reference to the way claims to maritime space should be 
derived is an implicit criticism of China’s U-shaped line. 
With China’s violation of the US-brokered deal over Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and 
China’s land reclamation activities, the United States has become even more critical toward 
Beijing and is increasing support for the Philippines in the South China Sea disputes. In 
April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement, which facilitates the deployment of US military personnel in the Philippines on 
a rotational basis.40 At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015, US Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter criticized China’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands, and he also 
announced the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, which will provide equipment 
and training to Southeast Asian states including the Philippines. In October 2015, when the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague decided to hear the Philippines-China case, 
John Kirby, the spokesperson for the US Department of State, answered in his daily press 
briefing that the decision was good and the US government takes note of the unanimous 
decision by the arbitral tribunal, adding that “the decision of the tribunal will be legally 
binding on both the Philippines and China” (Kirby 2015). The United States has also been 
engaging in the so-called Freedom of Navigation operations in the South China Sea by 
transiting inside 12 nautical miles of artificial islands China has created (Panda 2016). 
Despite the increased US support for the Philippines in the South China Sea disputes, 
the US government has not committed to the defense of the Philippines over the disputes. 
The most supportive statement of a senior US official so far seems to be that of Admiral 
Jonathan Greenert, the US Chief of Naval Operations, but even his statement has significant 
ambiguity. During his visit to the National Defense College of the Philippines in February 
2014, Greenert said that the United States will help the Philippines in the event of a Chinese 
occupation of disputed territories. In response to a question about a hypothetical Chinese 
occupation of one of the disputed islands, Greenert said “[o]f course, we would help you,” 
“[i] don’t know what that help would be specifically. I mean, we have an obligation because 
we have a treaty. But, I don’t know in what capacity that help is” (Mogato 2014).41 During 
his visit to the Philippines in April 2014, President Obama declared that US “commitment 
 
39  It should be noted that the United States has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). 
40  After the Philippines closed US bases in the early 1990s, it has not allowed the establishment of permanent 
bases by foreign states. The Philippines, therefore, hosts the US forces as “guests” in its bases. 
41  Also see Tiezzi (2014). In an interview a few days after Greenert’s remark, Admiral Harry Harris Jr., then 
commander of the US Pacific Fleet, supported his view: “Greenert reiterated the strength of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. He reaffirmed the US commitment to the Philippines with the Mutual Defense Treaty 
and I agree with that completely” (Villanueva 2014). 
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to defend the Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep that commitment, 
because allies never stand alone,” but he did not touch on the applicability of the alliance to 
the South China Sea disputes (neither China nor the South China Sea was mentioned in his 
speech) (White House 2014b). 
Thus, the relationship between the US-Philippines alliance and the South China Sea 
disputes remains ambiguous, as acknowledged in a US Congressional Research Service 
Report titled “The Republic of the Philippines and US Interests – 2014.”  
“The US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951, which forms the foundation of 
the bilateral security alliance, does not explicitly obligate the United States to come to the 
defense of maritime areas that are disputed by the Philippines and other nations, and may 
leave room for different interpretations.” (Lum/Dolven 2014: 12, emphasis in the original) 
The summary of another US Congressional Research Service Report, “Maritime Territorial 
Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress” (R42930, January 30, 2013) states that the US-
Japan security treaty “covers the Senkaku islets,” but “[t]he applicability of the US-
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to Philippine-claimed islands and waters in the South 
China Sea is less clear” (Dolven et al. 2013: summary). The summary of the same report 
updated in 2014 (R42930, May 14, 2014) does not mention the “less clear” applicability of 
the US-Philippines alliance, but both versions make the following point in the main text: 
“Some Philippine officials have on occasion suggested the Mutual Defense Treaty with the 
United States should apply in the case of disputes in Philippine-claimed waters of the South 
China Sea. On this question, the language of the treaty is not definitive. [...] Although some 
American analysts have expressed support for a stronger understanding of the Treaty, most 
US interpretations have not explicitly included the disputed areas as part of US obligations”. 
(Dolven et al. 2013: 29; Dolven et al. 2014: 31) 
In sum, although the United States has been increasing its support for the Philippines in the 
South China Sea disputes, it still maintains the neutrality over the maritime and territorial 
disputes and is also reluctant to commit to the defense of the Philippines over the disputes 
in a clear manner. 
3.4  Philippine Position on the US-Philippines Alliance and the South China 
Sea disputes  
Many Filipinos are skeptical or anxious about the applicability of the US-Philippines 
alliance to the South China Sea disputes.42 This is no surprise because, as seen in the 
previous section, the United States has yet to give a clear security commitment to the 
Philippines over these disputes. Nevertheless, to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis 
other claimants, the Philippine government has a clear interest in portraying the alliance as 
applicable to the disputes. Philippine officials have therefore asserted that the United States 
is obligated to defend the Philippines in a conflict over the South China Sea disputes 
(International Boundary Consultants 1998; Associated Press 2011).  
 
42  On the skeptical views, see, for example, Aurelio (2011) and Saludo (2014). 
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To date, the statement of Albert del Rosario, then Philippine Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, on May 9, 2012 seems to be the strongest case made by the Philippine government 
for the applicability of the alliance to the disputes. Among others, del Rosario made the 
following points: 
“On January 6, 1979, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in his letter to Philippine Foreign 
Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, cited Article V of the MDT [Mutual Defense Treaty] and stated 
that ‘… as provided in Article V, an attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels or 
aircraft in the Pacific would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the 
Philippines or island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the 
definition of Pacific area in Article V.’ […] 
On May 24, 1999, US Ambassador to the Philippines Thomas C. Hubbard wrote a letter to 
Foreign Secretary Domingo L. Siazon affirming that ‘the US Government stands by its 
statements in the Vance-Romulo letter of January 6, 1979.’ Moreover, in the same letter, 
Ambassador Hubbard cited Defense Secretary William Cohen’s statement that ‘the US 
considers the South China Sea to be part of the Pacific Area.’” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Philippines 2012)43 
It is important, however, to note that the US government seems to have disappointed del 
Rosario shortly before this statement, and his statement should be seen in the light of US 
reluctance to support the Philippines. Before del Rosario left for the first US-Philippine 2+2 
meeting (i.e. meetings involving foreign and defense secretaries of the two states) in April 
2012, he was quoted to have said that he would seek assurances that the United States would 
come to the aid of the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal. The press conference after the 
meeting (on April 30), however, suggested that he did not succeed (Philstar.com 2012; 
Clinton 2012).  
Finally, the Philippine government’s actual position on the applicability of the alliance to 
the dispute is likely to be less optimistic than its public position. In its private 
communication with the Philippine leaders, the US government is likely to be less 
supportive than in public, and the Philippine government has the obvious incentive to 
exaggerate the US support. 
3.5   Chinese position on the US-Philippines alliance and the South China Sea 
disputes 
Given the vague nature of US security commitment to the Philippines in the South China 
Sea, China is probably less worried about US intervention in the disputes than in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the likelihood of US intervention 
still keeps China cautious in its approach toward the Philippines, especially with regard to 
militarization of the disputes. Although the Philippines itself hardly presents threats to 
 
43  To my knowledge, the US government has not denied the accuracy of the statement. A Congressional 
Research Report (O’Rourke December 10, 2012: 31) quotes much of Rosario’s statement, including the two 
points listed above, and the updated versions of the report (O’Rourke September 18, 2015a: 54; December 22, 
2015a: 54; May 31, 2016: 64) also refer to Rosario’s statement, albeit without quoting the text. 
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China, the so-called emboldening effect of the US alliance may be more irritating and 
worrisome to Beijing in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea. Unlike Japan, the 
Philippines does not have enough capabilities on its own to resist China’s advances in the 
waters (that is, the alliance with the United States makes a much larger difference in the 
Philippine case). Furthermore, Philippine foreign policy is not constrained by a pacifist 
constitution and political tradition (that is, the Philippines has fewer domestic constraints 
against militarization of the dispute than Japan). 
Whereas the US-Japan alliance has been an important factor in China’s foreign policy 
since the inception of the alliance, the US-Philippines alliance has long been a minor issue 
for Beijing. The Philippines and China normalized their diplomatic relationship in June 
1975, and their relationship was reasonably cordial until China’s occupation of Mischief 
Reef was discovered in 1995. Even then, the US-Philippines alliance continued to be a 
minor problem for China, because the alliance had been weakened by the closure of US 
bases in the early 1990s and was dormant until the end of the 1990s (Park 2011). Even in the 
2000s, when the alliance had recovered from the dormancy, China was relatively benign 
toward the US-Philippines alliance. As Renato Cruz De Castro (2007: 4) points out,  
“Instead of being intimidated by the revived US-Philippine security relationship, China 
decided to join the counterterrorism bandwagon. A year after 9/11, Beijing offered to 
cooperate with Manila in ‘all fields of defense and the armed forces which facilitate stability 
and the development of the region and the world at large.’” 
As mentioned earlier, Sino-Philippine relations were relatively good during the presidency 
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010), who took an “equi-balancing” strategy (De  
Castro 2010) between China and the United States. China’s attitude toward the Philippines 
became more critical after Benigno Aquino III took the presidential office in 2010, because 
Aquino adopted a clear pro-US policy and harder stance against China in the South China 
Sea disputes (De Castro 2014). Rodrigo Duterte, who became president in June 2016, has 
been expected to take a more conciliatory approach toward China, but it is too soon to tell if 
the Sino-Philippine relations will improve under his presidency. 
As China became more assertive in the South China Sea, it has increased its criticism of 
the US involvement in the region. In June 2011, ahead of a meeting between senior Chinese 
and American officials, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said that the United 
States should “leave the [South China Sea] dispute to be sorted out between the claimant 
states,” “individual countries are actually playing with fire,” and he hopes “the fire will not 
be drawn to the United States” (Wong 2011; Associated Press 2011). Regarding the US 
Freedom of Navigation operations near China’s artificial islands in October 2015, Admiral 
Wu Shengli, commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, reportedly made the 
following point: “If the United States continues with these kinds of dangerous, provocative 
acts, there could well be a seriously pressing situation between frontline forces from both 
sides on the sea and in the air, or even a minor incident that sparks war” (Reuters 2015). 
Both the official position of the Chinese government and popular media are highly 
critical toward US alliances in Asia. In the wake of Obama’s trip to Asia in April 2014, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping criticized reinforcement of US alliances by saying that “[t]o 
beef up military alliances targeted at a third party is not conducive to maintaining common 
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security in the region” (Ruwitch 2014). Popular media take more direct and hawkish tones. 
For instance, an article on China Daily makes the following accusation and ominous 
warning. 
“To Washington, Manila appears an ideal stepping stone to implementing its ‘rebalancing to 
Asia’ strategy. Its covert and overt support to Manila is widely seen as a move to contain 
China’s rise. And Manila considers US support as a ticket to take more radical steps to 
consolidate its illegal occupation of Chinese isles and islets [...] Manila is prone playing with 
fire to provoke Beijing, and by continuing to do so it could spark an armed conflict one day. 
And should such a scenario occur, the US will find itself in an awkward position because 
being dragged into a full-blown conflict with China is something it does not want. It’s time the 
US realized nothing good could emerge out of its military alliance with the Philippines.” 
(Wang 2015) 
As with Japan in the East China Sea, China’s recent strategy in the South China Sea disputes 
seems to be to redefine the status quo without using military force (Fravel 2012).44 As 
already mentioned, China successfully seized the control of Scarborough Shoal after the 
standoff with the Philippines in 2012. Moreover, China’s land reclamation in the South 
China Sea has significantly changed the status quo without occupying additional land 
features in the waters. An editorial of the Global Times in July 2015 praised China’s land 
reclamation in the South China Sea as a masterpiece of diplomatic strategy because the 
United States and the Philippines could do nothing about it (Kyodo 2015). Such boasting 
was not clever on the part of China, but it is true that China has rapidly improved its 
strategic position in the South China Sea in the last few years – albeit with significant 
damage to its international image.  
In sum, despite the Philippine government’s claims to the contrary, the US government 
has not provided security commitments to the Philippines over the disputes in the South 
China Sea. Washington has been only willing to create strategic ambiguity over the 
applicability of the alliance. 
  
 
44  As Howard French (2014) points out, “China responds to most incursions into the disputed seas with its 
increasingly sophisticated and muscular coast guard, to avoid the appearance of militarization. The 
Philippines, like most states in the region, cannot match the capability of these vessels without using navy 
ships, which would look to the outside world like conflict escalation. For good measure, Chinese naval 
vessels often hover in the background, there to send a message and to be available in an emergency.” 
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4.  Conclusion  
This report analyzed the perceived applicability of the United States’ alliances with Japan 
and the Philippines to the allies’ disputes with China in the East and South China Seas. 
Specifically, it elucidated the history of the disputes, the relevant clauses of the alliance 
agreements, and how these states view the relationships between the alliance obligations 
and the disputes. Overall, the US-Japan alliance is widely considered to be applicable to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute whereas the US-Philippines alliance has only vague applicability to 
the South China Sea disputes.45 Beyond this general conclusion, the issue of applicability 
becomes significantly more complicated. 
As seen in the previous section, whether the United States is obligated to defend its ally 
depends on the way the ally is attacked, because the alliance agreements have conditions for 
activation. On the positive side, China’s behavior so far suggests that the US alliances deter 
China from armed attacks against the US allies in the disputes. On the negative side, 
however, there are ways for China to challenge the status quo without triggering US 
involvement, and such Chinese efforts escalate tensions in the waters. The United States 
should not give a blank check to its allies, but conditions that limit opportunistic behavior 
of the allies also allow China to more readily challenge the allies. 
Clarity of security commitment (or the lack thereof) is another important issue 
examined in this report.46 Applicability of alliance obligations is in the eyes of the beholder, 
and this fact is sometimes strategically used. For instance, despite its reluctance to invoke 
the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty over the South China Sea disputes, the US 
government has maintained ambiguity over its security commitment – most likely to deter 
China. In January 1974, in his discussion about the applicability of the US-Philippines 
alliance to the South China Sea disputes, then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed 
out the usefulness of such ambiguity. Although he thought that the United States “should 
not invoke the Mutual Security Treaty” over the Spratly Islands, he suggested that “some 
ambiguity in other people’s minds” may be helpful (Foreign Relations of the United States 
1969–1976). 
This report also shows that it is misleading to see the United States as a simple defender 
of its allies and deterrer of China. Media accounts and declassified information suggest that 
the United States has made efforts to restrain the allies, and these efforts, in combination 
with the US neutrality on the issue of sovereignty in the disputes, have probably moderated 
 
45  This report does not explain why the levels of US security commitment to Japan and the Philippines are 
different. Answering the question would require a separate paper, and I cannot offer more than brief 
conjectures here: Among others, Japan has been the strategically more important ally, and Japanese 
pacifism might have also reduced the US policy makers’ fear of military entanglement. Differences in the 
alliance treaty texts are also significant (namely, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are clearly “in the territories 
under the administration of Japan”). 
46  Texts of alliance agreements themselves can have different degrees of clarity, but the main difference in 
the US–Japan and US–Philippines alliances in terms of clarity derives from the US policy in 
communicating security commitment. 
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the emboldening effects of US security commitment. Additional support from the United 
States to Japan and the Philippines is likely to (and should) be combined with further 
measures to limit possible escalation by the protégés. 
Given the pivotal position the United States holds in the disputes’ dynamics, China, 
Japan, and the Philippines should take the US (conditional) neutrality on the disputes 
seriously.47 Granted, the United States may be keeping a façade to maintain strategic 
flexibility, but its position is still useful for avoiding escalation of the disputes, as long as it is 
combined with deterrence against military aggression. Rather than complaining about the 
problems of the US position, it is more constructive for the disputants to compete in their 
positive contribution to the peaceful management of the disputes, with the United States 
and the international society as the audience.  
For instance, the Japanese government should consider admitting that there exists a 
territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, because few outside Japan would see its 
current position plausible. The Philippine government should avoid physical clashes with 
foreign nationals (for example, in the process of arresting foreign fishermen) in the disputed 
waters in order to avoid the impression of aggressiveness. Accepting that its rising military 
capabilities inevitably alarm other states, China should refrain from aggressive rhetoric and 
assure its neighbors that it will not challenge the status quo of the disputes through military 
measures. The maritime and territorial disputes are important in the disputants’ domestic 
politics, but their importance should be balanced with the benefit of having good 
relationships with the United States, attracting support of the international society, and 
preventing military conflict in the waters. 
  
 
47  On “pivotal deterrence,” and how the United States can serve a useful role as a third party to disputes, see 
Crawford (2003). 
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